Christchurch mosque attacks: Gunman pleads guilty to murder, attempted murder and terrorism | Stuff.co.nz

The man accused of the Christchurch mosque attacks has entered shock guilty pleas, bringing relief to survivors and victims’ families.

Amid extraordinary coronavirus lockdown restrictions, Brenton Tarrant, 29, appeared via video-link in the High Court at Christchurch on Thursday morning and admitted 51 charges of murder, 40 charges of attempted murder and a charge of engaging in a terrorist act.

He’d previously pleaded not guilty to all the charges and was scheduled to stand trial on June 2.

GEORGE HEARD/STUFF
Fifty-one people died as a result of the March 15, 2019 attack.

Tarrant, who wore a grey prisoner sweater, was largely silent and emotionless throughout the hearing. He sat alone in a white room with a grey door at Auckland Prison, Paremoremo, where he’s held in maximum security.

The terrorist’s lawyers, Shane Tait and Jonathan Hudson, appeared via video-link from another court room.

Brenton Tarrant pleads guilty to murder, attempted murder and terrorism via AVL in the Christchurch High Court.

The names of all 51 people killed were read to Tarrant, before he was asked how he pleaded to the murder charges.

He replied: “Yes, guilty.”

The same process was followed for the attempted murder charges.

JOHN KIRK-ANDERSON/STUFF
Terrorist Brenton Tarrant pictured at his first court appearance, the day after the mosque shootings.

Justice Cameron Mander remanded Tarrant in custody, but has not yet set a date for sentencing, when the summary of facts would be made public.

Few people knew of the special hearing, which was only scheduled late Wednesday, on the eve of an unprecedented nationwide lockdown to prevent the spread of the Covid-19 coronavirus.

Six New Zealand journalists attended. Also in court were the imams from both targeted mosques. An-nur (Al Noor) imam Gamal Fouda was visibly upset as the guilty pleas were entered.

JOSEPH JOHNSON/STUFF
Mustafa Boztas still has a fragment of a bullet inside him.

The hearing concluded at 10.30am, but the judge suppressed the outcome for an hour to allow victims, who were unaware of the hearing, to be notified.

The decision to hold the hearing amid the national state of emergency was not made lightly.

Earlier in the week Tarrant indicated to counsel that he might change his pleas. A formal request was made on Wednesday that the matter be brought before the court.

DAVID WALKER/STUFF
Omar Abdel-Ghany, whose father Ahmed Gamal Eldin Abdel-Ghany was killed at Masjid An-Nur.

Mander said both the Crown and defence asked to have the hearing expedited, despite the severe health restrictions.

The courts were considered an essential public service that was able to deal with “priority proceedings without compromising people’s health”.

The judge said he felt the court had the capacity to safely hear the matter by limiting the number of people in court. In total, 17 people were present.

Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern reflects on the last year following the Christchurch mosque shootings.

It was regrettable the Covid-19 restrictions prevented victims from attending, he said, but the imams had been asked to be present to bear witness to the proceedings.

“It was my assessment that taking the defendant’s pleas at this time was the appropriate course in the circumstances,” Mander said.

“The entry of guilty pleas represents a very significant step towards bringing finality to this criminal proceeding, and I considered the need to take the opportunity to progress the matter was particularly acute coming as it has at a time when the risk of further delay as a result of Covid-19 was looming as realistic possibility.”

Mander said the defendant would not be sentenced before the court returned to normal operations.

The defendant had been remanded to a nominal date of May 1. It was hoped a sentencing date would be confirmed in the interim.

“It is fully anticipated that all who wish to attend court for the sentencing hearing will be able to do so in person.”  

On March 15 last year, Tarrant drove from his Dunedin home to Christchurch with an arsenal of guns and ammunition he’d amassed since moving from Australia to New Zealand in 2017.

The white supremacist entered Masjid An-nur (also known as the Al Noor Mosque) on Deans Ave as Friday prayers were beginning, about 1.40pm, and opened fire – killing and wounding dozens of people.

He then drove across town to the Linwood Mosque where he continued his shooting spree.

Tarrant was arrested a short time later after his car, a gold Subaru Outback, was rammed off the road by two police officers on Brougham St as he tried to make his way to a third target, though to be a mosque in Ashburton, where he planned to carry out another attack.

When police searched the vehicle they found several guns and petrol bombs.

NZ’S WORST MASS SHOOTING

In total, 51 people were killed in the terrorist attack, the worst mass shooting by an individual in New Zealand history.

Tarrant was the first person to be charged under NZ’s Terrorism Suppression Act 2002.

Omar Abdel-Ghany, whose father Ahmed Gamal Eldin Abdel-Ghany was killed at Masjid An-Nur, said he could not understand what caused Tarrant to change his plea.

“I’m both shocked and relieved. Shocked at the sudden change in plea, relieved that my family and I, along with other victims won’t have to relive it all through the courts.”

Muslim Association of Canterbury spokesman Tony Green said his immediate reaction was one of enormous relief and great gratitude.

“I think the victims will feel a huge weight has been lifted from their shoulders. Our position has always been to let justice take its course, but a trial would have put a lot of pressure on our families. If you look at the anguish caused by the trial of Grace Millane’s killer you can see how bad it would be for 51 families.”

Mustafa Boztas, who lay on the ground inside the Masjid An-nur with a bullet in his leg, pretending to be dead, said from Turkey he always knew Tarrant would be found guilty. 

“I feel he basically played with our minds and emotionally upset us more for no reason.”

Boztas said he would have stayed in the country instead of going overseas if he’d known Tarrant was going to plead guilty. 

“While it can’t undo the damage it has brought upon our community and country, it gives me hope that this help bring not only justice but some closure to those touched by this event.

“To the families, I hope this brings you peace, and a sense that love can conquer hate. While this closes the criminal proceedings for the shootings, please know there is still a long way to go in recovery for some of us, so thank you for your continued support.”

Yasir Amin, whose father 67-year-old Muhammad Amin Nasir was shot in the back by the gunman shooting from his car, said the guilty pleas were good news.

“It’s good to avoid a trial because we would be reminded of everything, every day of the six week trial. We’ve avoided that mental torture and we’re not in a situation where the outcome is not 100 per cent sure.”

Nasir was to undergo another operation on Monday but the operation was postponed due to Covid-19 measures. He had spent two months in hospital after the shootings and had another 20-day stay in December.

“He is now doing well. He goes for walks and eats well.”

Just about every organ in his father’s body except his heart had been damaged by the shotgun pellets, Amin said.

Nasir was shot about 200 metres from the mosque on Deans Ave. The gunman drove past Amin and his father, who were walking to the mosque along the footpath, when he aimed a shotgun at them from his car. Both ran for their lives but Nasir was shot. Their plight was captured by a motel CCTV camera. 

‘HE’S GOT TO PAY THE TIME’

Tarrant’s grandmother, Marie Fitzgerald, had no idea about the plea until called by Stuff.

“I feel sorry he did the crime, but he’s got to pay the time now.”

She declined to comment further.

Victim Support chief executive Kevin Tso said support was ongoing for hundreds of victims who still need help coping with the trauma of the event and rebuilding their lives.

“We’re pleased victims no longer have to face the trauma of the trial.”

The victims had shown remarkable courage and resilience in the face of a heart-breaking, shocking and senseless tragedy, Tso said.

“They have our utmost respect and promise that we will be here for them for as long as they need us.”

Police Commissioner Mike Bush said the pleas were a “significant milestone in respect of one of our darkest days”.

“I want to acknowledge the victims, their families and the community of Christchurch – the many lives that were changed forever. They have inspired all of us to be a kind and more tolerant community.”

Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern said it would provide some relief to the many people whose lives were “shattered” on March 15.

“These guilty pleas and conviction bring accountability for what happened and also save the families who lost loved ones, those who were injured, and other witnesses, the ordeal of a trial,” she said.

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EBB 117 – The Evidence on Inducing for Due Dates – Evidence Based Birth®

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Hi, everyone. On today’s podcast, we’re going to talk about the evidence on inducing labor for going past your due date.

Welcome to the Evidence Based Birth podcast. My name is Rebecca Dekker, and I’m a nurse with my PhD and the founder of Evidence Based Birth. Join me each week as we work together to get evidence-based information into the hands of families and professionals around the world. As a reminder, this information is not medical advice. See ebbirth.com/disclaimer for more details.

Hi, everyone. On today’s podcast, we’re going to talk about the evidence on inducing versus waiting for labor when you’re going past your due date. I’m going to be joined by Anna Bertone, MPH, our Research Editor at Evidence Based Birth to talk about this topic.

Before we get started, I have a quick announcement, and that is next week we are hosting free webinars for the public all about the Evidence Based Birth Childbirth Class. On Monday, March 2, we’ll host a special webinar just for parents. We’ll give you a peek behind the scenes at what it’s like to take our Evidence Based Birth Childbirth Class. Then on Tuesday, March 3, we’ll have a special webinar just for birth professionals to give you a tour of the Evidence Based Birth Childbirth Class so that you can decide if it’s something you’d like to recommend to your clients or not. You can register for these free webinars at evidencebasedbirth.com/childbirthclasswebinar. That’s all one word /childbirthclasswebinar.

All right, now back to the topic at hand, inducing labor for going past your due dates. Now before we begin, I do want to give a brief trigger warning. In our discussion about the research evidence on this topic, we will be talking about stillbirth and newborn death. So there has been a ton of new research on the evidence on induction versus waiting for labor when you go past your due date. So much research, in fact, that we have decided to separate our Signature Article on due dates into two separate articles.

So we still have the original article, The Evidence on Due Dates, which you can find at ebbirth.com/duedates. And although we updated that article a little bit, it’s remained very similar to previous additions. It talks about the length of a normal pregnancy, factors that can make you more or less likely to have a long pregnancy, et cetera. But then we separated out the research on induction into a new article that you can find at ebbirth.com/inducingduedates. This is a peer-reviewed article that covers all of the research on induction versus something called “expectant management” for going past your due date. And in today’s podcast, we’re going to update you on the latest info that we found for that article.

Just a heads up, we will not be covering the research evidence on inducing at 39 weeks. We already covered the ARRIVE study, a randomized trial that looked at induction versus expectant management for 39 weeks of pregnancy in episode 10 of the Evidence Based Birth podcasts. And just a tip, if you’re having trouble finding any of our earlier episodes of this podcast, iTunes has stopped showing the earliest podcasts, but they’re still out there and you can find them on Spotify and any other podcasting app. You can also find info about the ARRIVE study at ebbirth.com/arrive.

So we’re not going to talk about induction at 39 weeks. Instead, we’re going to be focusing on the evidence on induction versus waiting for labor once you reach 41 weeks. And to do so, we’re going to talk with our Research Editor, Anna. So welcome, Anna, to the Evidence Based Birth podcasts.

Anna Bertone:   Thank you! I’m glad to be on the podcast again.

So I want to start by explaining to our audience a little bit kind of about the background of why this topic is important. Inductions for non-medical reasons have been on the rise in the United States and all around the world for the past 30 years. And increasingly, more people who are pregnant are being induced for reaching their estimated due date. So we really want to cover the benefits and risks of elective induction for going past your estimated due date. And we’ll also talk about whether or not your goals and preferences for your birth matter, which of course they do, but that kind of plays a role as well.

So how often are people induced for going past their due date? Well, we don’t know for sure because this hasn’t been measured recently. But according to the 2013 Listening to Mothers III survey, which was now published about seven years ago, more than 4 out of 10 mothers in the U.S. said that their care provider tried to induce labor. Inducing labor for going past your due date was one of the most common reasons for an induction. Out of everyone who had an induction in this study, 44% said they were induced because their baby was full term and it was close to the due date. Another 18% said that they were induced because the healthcare provider was concerned that the mother was overdue.

The Centers for Disease Control in the U.S. also reported in 2018 that about 27% of people had their labor induced, but we think that number is probably low and that the percentage of people who have labor induced is under-reported in the Vital Statistics Program in the United States. So Anna, can you talk a little bit about why there’s so much controversy over this concept of electively inducing labor once you go past your due date?

Anna Bertone:   So why is there so much controversy about elective induction? Elective inductions by definition are labor inductions that do not have a clear medical reason for taking place. They occur for social reasons, like the provider wanting the mother to give birth before the provider goes out of town or for other non-medical reasons like the pregnancy getting uncomfortable and for the mother’s convenience. But there’s also a gray zone about what constitutes an elective induction. Many providers only consider an induction to be “elective” when the mother is healthy, pregnant with a single baby, and less than 41 weeks pregnant. The gray zone is that sometimes when the pregnancy goes past 41 weeks, some providers consider that to be a medically indicated induction rather than an elective induction. But in general, inductions are considered medically indicated when there are accepted medical problems or complications with the pregnancy that make it less safe to continue the pregnancy.

For many years, and I remember when I first entered the birth world in 2012, a lot of people talked about the fact that if you have an induction it doubles your chance of cesarean. And then all of a sudden there were people saying that wasn’t true. So can you talk a little bit about that controversy?

Anna Bertone:   So for many years, the common belief was that elective induction doubles the cesarean rate, especially in first-time mothers. But researchers nowadays consider those earlier studies to be flawed. In the earlier studies, what they would do is they would compare people assigned to elective induction to people who went into spontaneous labor. Nowadays, they don’t compare those two groups anymore. They compare people assigned to elective induction to the people assigned to what’s called expectant management, or in other words waiting for labor. And in that group, the person could either go into spontaneous labor or they could require an induction for medical reasons (so that would be a medically indicated induction), or they could choose elective induction further along in the pregnancy.

So that’s a subtle difference but an important one because in the earlier studies they compared elective induction to spontaneous labor. But you don’t have the choice to go into spontaneous labor today. Your choice is to be induced today or to wait for labor to start. And sometimes during that waiting period you might develop complications that require an induction, or you might change your mind and decide to have an elective induction, or you might go into spontaneous labor.

Anna Bertone:   Right. So nowadays, we compare a group assigned to elective induction to a group assigned to expectant management. One example of this was the ARRIVE trial.

The ARRIVE trial was a study comparing elective induction at 39 weeks versus expectant management. We’re not going to go into that trial in detail because we already covered it in detail in episode 10 of the Evidence Based Birth podcasts. But they actually found a lower risk of cesarean in the elective induction group. Researchers think that had to do with the fact that of the people in the expectant management group, more of them developed problems with blood pressure that required medical inductions and increased risk for complications. So again, that just kind of goes to show you that it does make a difference when you compare elective induction to expectant management.

Although, one thing you have to keep in mind with the ARRIVE study is that they had a very low cesarean rate in both groups compared to some settings. The cesarean rate was 19% in the elective induction group versus 22% in the expectant management group. So those research results cannot probably be generalized to settings with extremely high cesarean rates or high cesarean rates with inductions. We have some, for example, some professional members at Evidence Based Birth who talked to us about where they’re practicing and how high the cesarean rates are with the elective inductions there. So I think you have to be careful how you generalize or apply that data from the ARRIVE study, and we talk more about that in episode 10 of the podcast.

Which leads me to another point, and that is some cautions about the evidence. When I say generalize, that means taking research from a research study, and seeing if you can apply that to where people are giving birth in your community. So it’s important to understand that there are some major drawbacks to some of the research that we’re going to be talking about. Many of the studies are carried out in countries or time periods where there are low cesarean rates. So when that happens, when a study is carried out in a setting where culturally there’s low C-section rates, that might not apply to a hospital with high cesarean rates. If your hospital has high rates of “failed inductions” and strict time limits on the length of labor, then the evidence in these studies may not apply to you because induction might be more risky in your community hospital.

Also, another disclaimer about the evidence, in these trials, people are randomly assigned to induction or expectant management. And it’s important to remember that the people assigned to expectant management do not always go into labor spontaneously. There’s a mix of people in that group. Some of them do have a spontaneous labor. Others have an elective induction later on, and others have a medical induction for complications.

Also, you have to look at what they’re doing for fetal testing in the studies. In some studies there’s lots of fetal testing going on in the expectant management group. However, we’re going to talk about one of the studies where they were not doing any standard fetal monitoring during expected management. So those results might not apply to your community if your community does the fetal monitoring, and the study did not have fetal monitoring.

Finally, another disclaimer about the research evidence is that the induction protocols vary from study to study, and even within studies themselves. So knowing what the protocol was for induction in that study can be very helpful to decide if this is going to apply to your unique situation in your local community or not.

So with all of those disclaimers being said, there’s been quite a lot of new research in the past year about induction at 41 weeks. So Anna, can you talk about one of the most recent studies? Let’s talk about the INDEX trial from the Netherlands. There were two trials that came out in 2019, two large randomized control trials. Let’s talk about the INDEX one first.

Anna Bertone:   Sure. So the INDEX trial was from the Netherlands. INDEX stands for induction at 41 weeks, expectant management until 42 weeks. This was a large multicenter trial. It was conducted at 123 midwifery practices and 45 hospitals. Most of these pregnancies were managed by midwives.

…So this was the midwifery-led model of care-

Anna Bertone:   Exactly.

… which is very different than in the United States which is typically an obstetrician-led care model.

Anna Bertone:   The researchers randomly assigned a total of 1,801 pregnant people to either induction at 41 weeks and zero to one days or to wait for labor until 42 weeks and zero days, which is called expectant management. The reason they were able to conduct this study in the Netherlands and got ethical approval for it is because it was standard practice for them to not induce labor before 42 weeks with an uncomplicated pregnancy.

…Whereas in the U.S. it’s rare to see someone go to 42 weeks, in the Netherlands, they typically won’t induce you unless there’s medical reasons until you get to 42 weeks – 

Anna Bertone:   Exactly. So the mothers were enrolled in the study between 2012 and 2016. Everyone had to be healthy, and pregnant with single, head-down babies. The gestational ages were estimated with ultrasound before 16 weeks of pregnancy. They excluded people with a prior cesarean, with high blood pressure disorders, with expected problems with the baby’s growth, abnormal fetal heart rate, or known fetal malformations (congenital anomalies). In both groups, cervical ripening and induction methods depended on local protocol. It’s like what Rebecca was talking about earlier. There wasn’t a standard protocol to apply to both groups in this study when it came to cervical ripening and induction. It was based on local protocol. And this is an important weakness of the study because the providers might’ve managed labor inductions differently based on whether someone was being electively induced or was assigned to the expectant management group. It also limits the study’s generalizability, which means our ability to apply the results of this study to the population at large because providers don’t have an induction protocol that they can replicate.

…So we can learn from what happened in this study, but it’s difficult for us to apply it to across the board because there’s no specific induction protocol that could be followed – 

Anna Bertone:   Yeah. What happened was in the elective induction group, 29% of the participants went into labor before their induction and 71% were induced. Then in the expectant management group, 74% of the participants went into labor spontaneously before their planned induction and 26% were induced.

…And before we talk about how long the pregnancies were, I think it’s important for people to understand that when you have a randomized controlled trial like this the researchers do something called intent to treat analysis. So it doesn’t matter what type of birth they had, whether it was a spontaneous labor or a medical induction, the data were analyzed depending on which group you were originally assigned to. So if you were assigned to an elective induction but you happen to just quick go into labor on your own before the induction, you were still grouped with everyone in the elective induction group and vice versa. So that’s just an important distinction for people to understand. – 

Anna Bertone:   Yes. What happened with these results is that the median pregnancy was only two days shorter in the elective induction group compared to the expectant management group. This is interesting because they still found a difference between these two groups, but-

…And this is important because a lot of people ask us like, “Well, I only want to wait one more day, or two more days, or three or four more days,” but they’re saying by decreasing the length of the pregnancy by two days they found significant results. So what did they find in the INDEX trial? – 

Anna Bertone:   So for mothers, they found that there was no difference in the cesarean rates. This was taking place in a country with low cesarean rates. It was a midwifery model of care and the rates were very low in both groups (11%). 

They only had an 11% cesarean rate then?

Anna Bertone:   Yeah. They also had an outcome called a composite outcome, which is a combined outcome for mothers, and there was no difference in that measure either. They were looking for things like excessive bleeding after birth, manual removal of the placenta, severe tears, intensive care admission, and maternal death, and they didn’t find a difference in those things. There were no maternal deaths in either group. So as far as the bad outcomes for the mothers, there were about 11% to 14% in both groups, but not different.

…And what about for the babies then? – 

Anna Bertone:   And then for the babies, the babies in the elective induction group had a lower composite outcome rate. And in this composite outcome, what they were looking at was perinatal death, Apgar score less than seven at five minutes, low pH, meconium aspiration syndrome, nerve injury, brain bleeds, or admission to a NICU. And here they found a lower composite adverse outcome rate with the babies in the elective induction group (1.7% versus 3.1%). 

And why do they think that outcome was better with the elective induction group?

Anna Bertone:   They think that it was mostly due to the lower rate of Apgar scores less than seven at five minutes, and that probably contributed the most to having a lower adverse outcome rate with the babies in the elective induction group. The author’s note that there was no difference in rates of Apgar score less than four at five minutes, but they found that the combined outcome was still lower in the elective induction group if they used an Apgar score of less than four at five minutes and excluded fetal malformations. So basically, the babies in the elective induction group had better Apgar scores overall.

…And what about stillbirths? Because that’s like the main reason they’re doing these kinds of elective inductions, is to lower the risk of stillbirth. – 

Anna Bertone:   Yep. And they did not find a difference in stillbirth in this study. There was one stillbirth that occurred in the elective induction group. It was at 40 weeks and six days, before the mother was induced. Then, there were two stillbirths that occurred in the expectant management group while the mothers were waiting for labor.

Anna Bertone:   I looked for a few more details about those stillbirths because I was interested in that. Of the two stillbirths that occurred in the expectant management group, one was a small for gestational age baby at 41 weeks and three days to a first-time mother. The other one was to a mother with a prior birth, and that was at 41 weeks and four days. The mother’s placenta showed signs of infection (infection of the membranes). Then, the one stillbirth that occurred at in the elective induction group at 41 weeks was to an experienced mother (someone who had already had given birth before), and that was at 40 weeks and six days, and there was no explanation for that one. But with two versus one, they didn’t find a significant differences in stillbirths between those groups.

And what was the protocol for fetal monitoring in that study?

Anna Bertone:   There was no protocol for fetal monitoring. It depended on local guidelines, just like the induction and cervical ripening protocol. But the study authors say that fetal monitoring and assessment of amniotic fluid levels was typically done between 41 and 42 weeks. 

So how would you sum up the results of this INDEX study then?

Anna Bertone:   They found that elective induction at 41 weeks resulted in similar cesarean rates and less overall bad outcomes for babies compared to waiting for labor until 42 weeks. However, they say that the absolute risk of a bad outcome happening was low in both groups. It was 1.7% in the elective induction group versus 3.1% in the expectant management group (the group that waited until 42 weeks).

All right. Well, the next study we wanted to talk about was the SWEPIS trial from Sweden, also published in 2019, also coming out of Europe. It’s S-W-E-P-I-S, and it stands for the Swedish post-term induction study, or SWEPIS. It got a lot of media attention with headlines like … There was one that said, “Post-term pregnancy research canceled after six babies died.” And it is true that this study was ended early after deaths in the study. The researchers intended to enroll 10,000 mothers from multiple centers across Sweden, but they ended up stopping the study with about 1,380 people in each group after their data safety and monitoring board found a significant difference in perinatal death between the groups.

Data safety and monitoring boards are basically a board that keeps track of what’s going on in the study. They get interim reports. And if they see any concerning safety issues, they have the power to stop the studies. That’s a standard part of a lot of randomized controlled trials is to have one of these safety boards.

Similar to the INDEX trial in the Netherlands, in Sweden, labor is typically not induced before 42 weeks if you have an uncomplicated pregnancy. Also similar to the Netherlands, in Sweden, midwives manage most of the pregnancies and births. It’s a midwifery-led model of care.

The purpose of the SWEPIS study was to compare elective induction at 41 weeks and zero to two days versus expectant management and induction at 42 weeks and zero to one day if the mother hadn’t gone into labor by that point. The study was carried out in the years 2015 to 2018. The researchers enrolled healthy mothers with single babies in head-first position. They had accurate gestational ages. They excluded people with a prior cesarean, diabetes, and other complications such as high blood pressure, small for gestational age, or known fetal malformations.

There is a pretty low stillbirth rate in Sweden, so they thought they would need about 10,000 people to see a difference between groups, but they ended up not needing nearly that many people to find a difference in stillbirth rates. One of the big strengths of the SWEPIS trial is that in contrast to the INDEX trial, in the SWEPIS trial they defined an induction protocol and they used that same protocol with everyone in the elective induction group and everyone in the expected management group who had an induction. The protocol was basically if the mother’s cervix was already ripe, they simply broke her water and gave her oxytocin as needed by IV. If the mother’s cervix was not ripe or the baby’s head was not engaged, they used mechanical methods or Misoprostol, or prostaglandins, or oxytocin, but they did cervical ripening first.

In the elective induction group, most of the people were induced. 86% had their labor induced. 14% went into labor spontaneously before the induction. In the expectant management group, 67% of them went into labor spontaneously and 33% ended up with an induction. Similar to the INDEX trial, there was a really tiny difference in the length of pregnancy between groups. Pregnancy in the elective induction group was in general only three days shorter than pregnancy in the expectant management group, but yet they did go on to find significant differences.

So what the SWEPIS trial found was that for babies – this is why this study was stopped early – there were five stillbirths and one early newborn deaths in the expectant management group out of 1,379 participants for a death rate of 4.4 deaths per 1,000 women. There were zero deaths in the elective induction group out of 1,381 participants. All five stillbirths in the expectant management group happened between 41 weeks, two days and 41 weeks, six days. Three of the stillbirths had no known explanation. One was for a baby that was small for gestational age. The other was with a baby who had a heart defect. There was one newborn death that occurred four days after birth due to multiple organ failure in a baby that was large for gestational age.

The authors mentioned that when complications are present at the end of pregnancy, such as problems of the placenta, or the umbilical cord, or fetal growth, these problems may become increasingly important as each day of pregnancy progresses, which they believe is why they found a higher death rate with expectant management past 41 weeks.

Another key finding of the study was that all of these deaths occurred to first-time mothers, which suggests that 41-week induction may be especially beneficial for babies of first-time mothers. They found that it only took 230 inductions at 41 weeks to prevent one death for a baby, and this was a much lower number than previously thought. If you remember, though, as Anna was saying, the INDEX trial did not find a significant difference in death between the induction group and the expectant management group. We think the reason the SWEPIS study found a difference was because it was a larger study, it was better able to detect differences in rare outcomes like death. Also, with the SWEPIS study, there might not have been as good fetal monitoring. So it’s possible that the better fetal monitoring of participants between 41 weeks and 42 weeks in the INDEX trial might’ve been protective, leading to fewer perinatal deaths. We can’t be certain though because there were no fetal monitoring protocols in either trial.

Another thing to note is that participants in the SWEPIS expectant management group tended to give a birth a little later than the participants in the INDEX expectant management group. That might help explain the higher perinatal death rate in the expectant management group in SWEPIS. They did not find a difference in what they call the composite adverse perinatal outcome, which included death, low Apgar scores, low pH, brain bleeds, brain injury, seizures, and several other major complications, but there was that significant difference in perinatal death (either having a stillbirth or newborn death).

Also, the elective induction babies were less likely to have an admission to intensive care, 4% versus 5.9%. They had fewer cases of jaundice, 1.2% versus 2.3%, and fewer of them were big babies, 4.9% versus 8.3%.

For mothers, the outcomes were overall pretty good. There were no differences in cesarean rates similar to the other trial. The cesarean rate in this study in both groups was about 10% to 11%. More mothers in the elective induction group had an inflammation of the inner lining of the uterus called endometritis, 1.3% versus 0.4%. And on the other hand, more mothers in the expected management group developed high blood pressure, 3% versus 1.4%. They also interviewed the women in both groups and they found that the mothers in the expectant management group really struggled with negative thoughts. They described feeling in limbo while they waited to go into labor. So Anna, can you talk a little bit about the fetal monitoring in this study and how it may have differed from the other study?

Anna Bertone:   Sure. Fetal monitoring in this study was done per local guidelines. So there was no study protocol for fetal monitoring during the 41st week of pregnancy. However, the mothers recruited from one region of Sweden, called the Stockholm region, which made up about half the people in the study, had ultrasound measurements of their amniotic fluid volume and abdominal diameter at 41 weeks, whereas the people that came from the other areas of Sweden in the study did not receive these assessments regularly. None of the six deaths that occurred in this study occurred in the Stockholm region of Sweden where they received this type of fetal monitoring, which leaves us with the question of how important was this fetal monitoring. Could it have made the difference between the Stockholm region participants not experiencing fetal deaths whereas participants from other regions did?

Anna Bertone:   So that’s just an important thing to keep in mind with this study is that the fetal monitoring may have made a difference as far as the perinatal outcomes. It also means that the results of the SWEPIS study might not apply equally to mothers who receive fetal monitoring at the end of pregnancy, specifically during that 41st week of pregnancy which seems to be the really critical time period. Another thing, all of the perinatal deaths in this study occurred to first-time mothers, which tells us that the results might not apply equally to mothers who have already given birth before.

…So in the SWEPIS study, out of the mothers in the study who had already given birth before and were having a subsequent baby, none of them experienced this stillbirth or newborn death, correct?

Anna Bertone:   Correct. Yes.

Okay. So all of the perinatal deaths occurred to first-time mothers.

Anna Bertone:   And the first-time mothers, by the way, they only made up about half of the participants in the sample, so it was about a 50/50 split.

So all of the fetal and newborn deaths from this study came from first-time mothers who lived in the areas of Sweden that did not do any prescribed fetal monitoring during that 41st week of pregnancy.

Anna Bertone:   That’s my understanding. Correct.

Okay. So those are the two big randomized trials that came out in 2019. Before they were published, there was a 2018 Cochrane meta-analysis. Anna, I was wondering if you could talk a little bit about that. This study did not include the SWEPIS and the INDEX trials, but we still wanted to talk about it in our article. So can you explain to our listeners a little bit about this Cochrane review?

Anna Bertone:   Sure. There was a 2018 Cochrane review and meta-analysis by Middleton. Unlike these randomized control trials that we were just talking about, they didn’t focus specifically on the 41st week of pregnancy versus the 42nd week of pregnancy. It was much more broad than that. What they did was they looked at people who were electively induced at some point, and compared them to people who waited for labor to start on its own until some point. So there was a much more broad range of gestational ages there. But they included 30 randomized control trials with over 12,000 mothers, and they compared a policy of induction at or beyond term versus expectant management. All of the trials took place in Norway, China, Thailand, the U.S., Austria, Turkey, Canada, the UK, India, Tunisia, Finland, Spain, Sweden, and the Netherlands.

So it’s quite a global sample.

Anna Bertone:   Yes. But one study in this meta-analysis really dominated and accounted for about 75% of the data, and that was the Hannah post-term trial that I think Rebecca is going to be talking about soon. Because that one trial dominated this meta-analysis so much, most of the data was on giving birth at 41 weeks or later.

And they did not include the ARRIVE trial in this meta-analysis.

Anna Bertone:   Right. They didn’t include the ARRIVE, INDEX, or SWEPIS trials. So in its next update, it’s going to be updated with those three randomized control trials. But they did include 30 other randomized control trials. What they found was that a policy of induction at term or beyond term was linked to 67% fewer perinatal deaths compared to expectant management. So that was two deaths with induction at or beyond term versus 16 deaths in the people assigned to expected management.

Anna Bertone:   The Hannah post-term trial excluded deaths due to fetal malformations, but some of the smaller trials that were included in the Cochrane meta-analysis did not. So if we exclude the three deaths from severe fetal malformations, then the final count is one death in the induction group and 14 in the expectant management group. So it doesn’t change the results too much overall to exclude fetal malformations. Overall, they found that the number needed to treat was 426 people with induction at or beyond term to prevent one perinatal death. Specifically, there were fewer stillbirths with a policy of induction at or beyond term.

Which was a different number needed to treat than the SWEPIS trial, which found only took 230 inductions at 41 weeks to prevent one perinatal death.

Anna Bertone:   Yeah. I think part of the reason the SWEPIS trial was so groundbreaking and got so much media attention is because it did find a lower number needed to treat than had been found previously. So the absolute risk of perinatal death was 3.2 per 1,000 births with the policy of expected management versus 0.4 deaths per 1,000 births with the policy of induction at or beyond term. They found that a policy of induction was linked to slightly fewer cesareans compared to expectant management, 16.3% versus 18.4%.

Anna Bertone:   Fewer babies assigned to induction had Apgar scores less than seven at five minutes compared to those assigned to expectant management. They didn’t find any differences between the groups with the rate of forceps or vacuum assistance at birth, perinatal trauma, excessive bleeding after birth, total length of hospital stay for the mother, newborn intensive care admissions, or newborn trauma. The authors concluded that individualized counseling might help pregnant people choose between elective induction at or beyond term or continuing to wait for labor. They stress that providers should honor the values and preferences of the mothers.

We need more research to know who would or would not benefit from elective induction. And the optimal time for induction is still not clear from the research, which is what they said in 2018. I think Rebecca’s going to talk about the famous Hannah post-term study that accounted for 75% of the data in that meta-analysis.

Yeah, so we’re kind of working backwards through time. We started with the 2019 randomized trials, then the 2018 meta-analysis where they said the optimal time for induction is not clear, but they stated that before the two new randomized trials came out. Then even before then going back in time is the 1992 Hannah post-term study, which is one of the most important studies on inducing for going past your due date and it was the largest randomized trial ever done on this topic, larger even than INDEX or SWEPIS. And it controls most of the findings in that Cochrane meta-analysis that Anna just described.

So let’s look at what happened in this study because it plays so much of a role in the meta-analysis. It was carried out between the years 1985 and 1990 when a group of researchers enrolled 3,407 low-risk pregnant people from six different hospitals in Canada into the study. Women could be included if they were pregnant with a live single fetus, and they were excluded if they were already dilating, if they had a prior cesarean, pre-labor rupture membranes, or a medical reason for induction.

This study had a much different expectant management protocol than INDEX or SWEPIS because unlike those studies where the longest you would go was 42 weeks and zero to one or two days, in the Hannah post-term study, the people assigned expectant management were monitored for as long as 44 weeks pregnancy before they were induced, so up to a month past your due date, which is almost unheard of today. At around 41 weeks, people who agreed to be in the study were either randomly assigned to have an induction of labor or fetal monitoring with expectant management.

In the induction group, labor was induced within four days of entering the study, usually about 41 weeks and four days. If the cervix was not ripe and if the fetal heart rate was normal, they were given a prostaglandin E2 gel to ripen the cervix. They used a maximum of three doses of gel every six hours. If this did not induce labor or if they did not need the gel, people were given IV oxytocin, had their waters broken, or both. And they could not receive oxytocin until at least 12 hours after the last prostaglandin dose.

So one strength of this study is that it had a defined induction protocol that providers could replicate. But the big weakness of this study is that the expectant management group did not have that same induction protocol. In the monitored or expected management group, people were taught how to do kick counts every day and they had a non-stress tests three times per week. They also had their amniotic fluid levels checked by ultrasound two to three times per week. And labor was induced if there were concerning results in the non-stress test, or if there was low amniotic fluid, or if the mother developed complications, or if the person did not go into labor on their own by 44 weeks. And if doctors decided the baby needed to be born, mothers in expectant management group did not receive any cervical ripening. Instead, they either had their water broken and/or IV oxytocin, or they just went straight to a cesarean without labor. So Anna, do you want to talk a little bit about what the researchers found in the study?

Anna Bertone:   What the researchers found in the Hannah post-term study is that in the induction group, 66% of the people were induced and 34% went into labor on their own before induction. And in the expectant management group, 33% were induced and 67% went into labor on their own. There were two stillbirths in the group assigned to wait for labor and zero in the group assigned to induction. This difference was not considered to be statistically significant, which means we don’t know if it happened by chance or if it was a true difference between the groups. The more interesting outcome to look at with the Hannah post-term trial are the findings on cesarean rates because they differ depending on what numbers you look at. You can either look at the outcomes for the two original groups, which were the people randomly assigned to induction and then those assigned to expectant management, or you can look at the breakdown of what actually happened to the people in the two groups, in other words what happened to the people who were actually induced or who actually went into spontaneous labor.

Anna Bertone:   So what happened in the original randomly assigned groups? If you look at the two original groups, the overall cesarean rate was lower in the induction group. It was 21.2% versus 24.5%. That was even after taking into account factors like the mother’s age, whether or not it was her first baby, and cervical dilation at the time of study entry. Or you could look at what happened with the people who were actually induced or who actually went into labor on their own. And if you look at that, you see two very interesting things. You see that people who went into spontaneous labor, regardless of which group they were assigned to, they had a cesarean rate of only 25.7%. But if people in the monitoring group had an induction, their cesarean rate was much higher than all the other groups. It was 42%. The same was true for both first-time mothers and for mothers who had given birth before.

Anna Bertone:   So what does this mean? It means that only the people who were expectantly managed but then had an induction had a really high cesarean rate. The people who were expectantly managed and then went into labor spontaneously did not have a higher cesarean rate. One possible reason for this, for the highest cesarean rate seen in the people who were assigned to expectant management but then ended up getting an induction, is that the people in this group might’ve been higher risk to begin with since a medical complication could have led to their induction. The people that were assigned to expectant management and never developed a complication requiring an induction, those were the lower risk people, which means they were the ones less likely to end up giving birth by cesarean.

Anna Bertone:   Then, another important factor that I know Rebecca has discussed previously is that doctors might’ve been quicker to call for a cesarean when assisting the labors of people with medical inductions if their pregnancies were beyond 42 weeks. They may have been less patient waiting for labor.

…Or more easily worried about the course of the labor, big baby, etc. – 

Anna Bertone:   Yes. More worried.

So basically, it seems like from the Hannah post-term trial, one of the benefits of considering expectant management is that if you do have spontaneous labor, your chance of cesarean is pretty low. But the risk is that you’ll develop medical complications and need an induction, in which case an induction at 42 weeks is going to be riskier than an induction at 41 weeks. So what do you think? We have all this research from all over the world, from the Hannah post-term trial, to the 2018 meta-analysis, to two trials out in 2019. Do you still feel like routine induction at 41 weeks is still going to be controversial or not?

Anna Bertone:   I think it’s definitely still controversial, and I think everybody’s still processing the results from the INDEX trial and the SWEPIS trial. Rebecca and I reached out to Dr. Wennerholm who conducted the SWEPIS trial in Sweden, and she said she’s currently working on secondary analysis of the data. They’re talking about the economic implications of the findings in Sweden and what it means for Swedish national policy. So I think it’s still controversial. People are still talking about what to make of these findings.

Anna Bertone:   There was another systematic review from 2019 by Riedel. This one came out too early to include the SWEPIS and the INDEX trials, but it’s still interesting to look at. Because unlike the Middleton Cochrane review, these authors were specifically interested in induction during the 41st week of pregnancy versus during the 42nd week of pregnancy. So in their analysis, they restricted the studies only to people having a routine induction at 41 weeks and zero to six days versus routine induction at 42 weeks and zero to six days. If you remember, the Cochrane review was much broader than that. They also only looked at studies published within the last 20 years. They only looked at studies with low-risk participants, and they ended up with three observational studies, two randomized controlled trials, and two studies that they called “quasi experimental studies”, which they grouped with the randomized controlled trials even though these studies weren’t truly randomized.

Anna Bertone:   What they found was one perinatal death in the 41 week induction group and six deaths in the 42 week induction group. That was a rate of 0.4 versus 2.4 per 1,000. This finding was not statistically significant. In other words, we don’t have strong enough evidence that this couldn’t have happened by chance. These same studies, those two randomized controlled trials and the two quasi experimental studies, they showed no difference in cesarean rates between groups also. But the authors did report that one observational study found an increase in the cesarean rate with the 41 week induction group. So basically, they’re saying if you look much more narrowly at the evidence of induction during the 41st week versus the 42nd week, then there might not be a significant difference in the death rate.

But that Riedel study from 2019 is already outdated because that was before the two big randomized trials came out.

Anna Bertone:   Yes. We need to see a systematic review and meta-analysis that includes those two randomized controlled trials and see if that changes. These authors also expressed concerns about the cesarean rate possibly rising with 41-week induction because both the SWEPIS trial and the INDEX trial took place in countries with very low cesarean rates. So we just don’t really know at this point whether there would be a difference in cesarean rates if they took place in countries with higher rates of cesarean, such as the U.S.

Anna Bertone:   So I think it is still controversial. There’s also countries that are changing their policies about induction and going back and looking at whether that policy change led to any difference in outcomes. One such country is Denmark. They just published a study where they compared birth outcomes from 2000 to 2010 versus 2012 to 2016. And in that time period there was a change in policy from recommending induction at 42 weeks and zero days to 41 weeks and three to five days. They included over 150,000 births in the dataset. And when they looked back, they didn’t see any difference in stillbirths, or perinatal deaths, or low Apgar scores when they compared the period before versus after the policy change. The perinatal death rate was already declining before the policy change in 2011, and it just continued going down without any additional impact from the 2011 policy change. There was also no impact on the rate of Cesareans with the policy to switch from 42 weeks to 41 weeks.

Anna Bertone:   That’s just an example of how this is still controversial. Countries are implementing new policies, and Sweden and the Netherlands may implement new policies based on the INDEX and the SWEPIS studies. Then they’ll probably conduct a study the same way that Denmark did to see if that policy change had any real impact on the population.

I think it’s important to mention, though, that with the Denmark national policy, they switched from 42 weeks and zero days to 41 weeks and three to five days, and that might not have been early enough to make an impact on the stillbirth rate because the studies that we were looking at from 2019, SWEPIS and INDEX, were looking at inductions happening at 41 weeks and zero to one or two days and it was that couple of days difference that made the difference between low stillbirth rate and a higher stillbirth rate.

Anna Bertone:   Right. Exactly. I think that future researchers shouldn’t group 41 weeks and zero to six days together in one grouping because there seems to be differences between the earlier part of the 41st week and the later part of the 41st week because, like you said, SWEPIS and INDEX found that waiting even just two or three days make a difference in outcomes during that week.

So let’s just sum up the pros and cons of induction at 41 weeks versus continuing to wait for labor since that’s what we have the bulk of the evidence on now. I would say that the research shows that the pros of inducing labor at 41 weeks include a lower risk of stillbirth, especially among those with risk factors for stillbirths such as being pregnant with your first baby. In our article, we have a table of the pros and cons. The absolute risk of stillbirth is 4 out of 10,000 pregnancies at 39 weeks, 7 out of 10,000 pregnancies at 40 weeks, 17 out of 10,000 pregnancies at 41 weeks, and 32 stillbirths out of 10,000 pregnancies at 42 weeks. Research also shows a lower risk of the baby receiving intensive care with an elective induction at 41 weeks, lower risk of the baby having jaundice, lower risk of the baby being large for gestational age, and lower risk of needing a cesarean, although that finding may depend on your practice setting. There is a lower risk of mother developing a high blood pressure disorder. at the end of pregnancy. And for some people, they may find an elective induction at 41 weeks convenient and it could help them end an uncomfortable pregnancy.

Also, in our article, we reference one study that found some cognitive benefits for babies. It suggests that the cognitive benefits for the baby from the mom remaining pregnant appear to increase until about 40 to 41 weeks after which there’s no cognitive benefits to the baby’s brain development for continuing to remain pregnant. So Anna, can you share the cons of elective induction at 41 weeks?

Anna Bertone:   Yeah. One of the cons of being induced at 41 weeks instead of continuing to wait and see if you go into labor is the potential for medicalization of birth. One example of this is continuous fetal monitoring may occur if you have the induction, whereas you might not get continuous fetal monitoring if you go into labor on your own spontaneously during that 41st week. 

Anna Bertone:   Another con would be a potential for failed induction leading to a cesarean. That also depends a lot on your practice setting. Another con is the potential for uterine tachysystole, which is defined as more than five contractions in 10 minutes averaged over 30-minute window. There’s a potential increase in the risk of uterine rupture with medical induction. That is especially important among people with a previous cesarean having a VBAC.

Anna Bertone:   Another con is missing the hormonal benefits of spontaneous labor. Another con is increased risk of mother getting inflammation of the inner lining of the uterus, endometritis. One study found that as a possible risk of induction 41 weeks. Then, lastly, medically-induced contractions might increase pain and make epidural use more likely.

We also have a section in the article where we talk about whether there are any benefits to going past your due date. That table we just took you through was comparing the benefits and risks of elective induction. In terms of benefits of going past your due date, one of the major benefits of awaiting for spontaneous labor are the hormonal benefits, which Anna briefly mentioned. In our article, we link to the book Hormonal Physiology of Childbearing by Dr. Sarah Buckley, which talks about the physiologic understandings and the physiology of spontaneous labor. So that is something to keep in mind, and that’s one reason why some people prefer to wait for spontaneous labor. So Anna, if someone wants to wait for labor to begin on its own and they’re talking with their care provider about expectant management, what’s kind of the bottom line about that?

Anna Bertone:   I think the bottom line about that is it all needs to be very individualized. When someone goes past their estimated due date, they could talk to their care provider about the benefits and the risks of elective induction versus continuing to wait for labor and how those benefits and risks apply to them personally. Most research articles and guidelines say that because there are benefits and risks to both options, the pregnant person’s values, goals, and preferences should play a part in the decision-making process.

Anna Bertone:   It’s important for expectant families to be aware of the growing research evidence showing that there could be worse health outcomes for those who wait for labor after 41 weeks of pregnancy instead of being induced at 41 weeks, especially among first-time mothers and those with additional risk factors for stillbirth. But ultimately, after receiving accurate evidence-based information and having conversations with their care providers, pregnant people have the right to decide whether they prefer to induce labor or wait for spontaneous labor with appropriate fetal monitoring.

I want to also let people know about a couple more resources that are in this article at evidencebasedbirth.com/inducingduedates. We have a section all about how people and their care providers can talk about the risk of stillbirth with some sample scripts that healthcare providers can use when they’re talking about risks of stillbirth. We also have links to different guidelines from different organizations about induction at 41 weeks. Then we also have our section called The Bottom Line. So what would you say are some of the bottom lines, Anna, about elective induction at 41 weeks and zero to two days?

Anna Bertone:   I think the bottom line is that elective induction at 41 weeks and zero to two days could help to reduce stillbirths and poor health outcomes for babies without increasing harm, like the risk of Cesarean for mothers. We’re getting that from those two large randomized controlled trials published in 2019 that both found benefits to elective induction at 41 weeks instead of continuing to wait for labor until 42 weeks. One of those studies, as we mentioned, found less perinatal death with 41 week induction and the other found fewer poor health outcomes for babies like intensive care unit admission and low Apgar scores with 41 week induction. Neither of those trials found an increase in the risk of Cesarean during birth with 41 induction compared to continuing to wait for labor until 42 weeks. However, both of those trials took place in countries that follow the midwifery model of care and the overall Cesarean rates were very low. So I think it remains to be seen how that will translate into countries like the U.S. that have higher Cesarean rates. 

So I hope you all found this podcast helpful in looking at the recent research on induction at 41 weeks versus expectant management. Make sure you check out the blog article that goes along with this podcast episode for all of the resources, links, research references. We also have a free one-page handout you can download that summarizes the results of this research. Just go to evidencebasedbirth.com/inducingduedates to download that new article. Thank you so much, Anna, for joining us to help our listeners understand the evidence.

Anna Bertone:   Happy to do it, Rebecca. Thank you.

Today’s podcast was brought to you by the PDF library inside the Evidence Based Birth Professional Membership. The free articles that we provide to the public at evidencebasedbirth.com and this free podcast as well as other resources are supported by our Professional Membership program. Everyone who joins our professional membership gets access to a library with all our printer-friendly PDFs. Each signature article that we publish online has been turned into a professionally-designed, easy-to-print PDF so that our members can print and share evidence-based info with their clients, other parents, or other professionals. To learn how you can become a member today, visit ebbirth.com/membership.

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Facebook Appoints Derya Matraş as Regional Director For Africa

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Social media giant, Facebook has appointed Derya Matraş as its Regional Director for the Africa, Middle East and Turkey.

This new appointment comes quite early in 2020 and according to Facebook, Derya will be charged with leading the platform to serve Facebook’s businesses and communities in the region.

@Facebook Middle East has just appointed their new Regional Director, Derya Matras. https://t.co/WYYL0Gjh8E

— CommunicateOnline (@CommunicateME)

This is because the regions, Middle East, Africa and Turkey, are an important market for Facebook and it is important that the company’s impact on the region increases.

The fast-growing Middle East, Africa and Turkey region is an important market for Facebook. Derya’s wealth of experience in emerging markets and her pioneering spirit will help us further drive impact and value in this uniquely diverse region, while maintaining our mission of bringing people together and building communities.

Derya holds a BsC in Electronics Engineering from Bogazici University, Instanbul, Turkey as well as an MBA from Columbia Business School. Prior to this recent appointment, Derya was the Country Director for Facebook in Turkey charged with the role of driving growth for brands, agencies and the digital ecosystem.

Facebook Appoints Derya Matraş as Regional Director For Africa, Middle East and Turkey
Derya Matraş, the New Regional Director for Facebook

Before Facebook, she has worked in executive roles at various companies. One of them is McKinsey and Company where she served as an management consultant. She was also vice president of the largest media conglomerate in Turkey, Dogan Media Group.

She’s expected to bring her wealth of experience to her new role as Regional Director where she will lead the company’s charge to grow its economic and social impact across the regions.

Speaking on her appointment, Derya Matraş reiterated Facebook’s commitment to supporting the millions of businesses in the region that rely on its services.

“As a woman leader, I am very proud to be appointed to this region where diversity is of crucial importance, and I am looking forward to continuing to drive our significant economic and social value contribution,” she says.

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Persecution of Muslims in China and India Reveals Important Facts About Religion and Geopolitics

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India, China and Myanmar are three Asian countries currently engrossed in carrying out physical and cultural genocides on their Muslim populations. While the plight of Rohingya Muslims and Uighur Muslims is well known, the recent introduction of a new law expressly aimed at dispossessing Muslims of Indian citizenship has alerted many to the reality that India’s ruling BJP government sees itself as Hindu first and foremost.

Questions such as “Why aren’t the rich Arab countries saying anything?” have come up, with the implicit inference that Muslim-dominated countries are supposed to stick up for Muslims everywhere in the world. Others have pointed out that despite suffering oppression in some parts of the world, Muslims are also responsible for brutal acts of oppression against other minority groups elsewhere, which allegedly negates the sufferings of the prior group.

In this article, I will pick through these questions and viewpoints with a goal of isolating some useful truths about how religion, geopolitics and human nature constantly interplay and produce much of the world around us.

Oppression is a Matter of Perspective

Which religion is the most oppressed? I like to troll my Christian friends with the image below whenever the topic comes up about some religion or the other allegedly imposing its will at their expense.

The truth is however, that this image could apply to just about every religion on earth. As a general rule of thumb, the only limiting factor on whether or not a religion functions as an oppressive tyranny in a particular jurisdiction is the proportion of the population that practises it there. Similarly, the only thing stopping any religion from being an oppressed and downtrodden identity is whether it is a small enough minority for that to be possible.

While Muslims in India, Myanmar and China are going through untold degrees of horror because of their religious identities, Muslims in places like Bangladesh, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Malaysia and Northern Nigeria are simultaneously visiting very similar horrors on Bah’ai, Shia Muslims, Christians, Budhists and other minorities in those areas. It turns out that the mere fact of belonging to a religious identity does not in fact, confer unrestricted global victimhood.

This point is important because it disproves the notion held by every major religion that its adherents follow a single set of standards and do things in the manner of a global “brotherhood.” In reality, Islam according to a Rohingya Muslim hiding from the Burmese military, and the same religion according to an itinerant herder in Kogi State bear almost no similarity to each other save for the most basic tenets. Environmental factors in fact have a bigger influence on how religions are practised than their own holy books. 

The current antics of India’s ruling BJP and its Hindu fundamentalist support base provide an important case in point as to how this works. Looking at the evolution of Hinduism from a passive philosophy into an openly militant ideology gives an important insight into how religion is in fact, a thoroughly contrived and amorphous set of ideas that can be changed, adjusted, aligned and revised at a moment’s notice in justification of anything at all. 

Hinduism traditionally sees itself as a religion of thoughtful, considered spirituality as against the angry dogmas of its Abrahamic neighbours, but something interesting is happening. Some argue that it started in the days of Gandhi, and some ascribe it to current Prime Minister Nanendra Modi, but whoever started it is a side note. The key point to note is that based on political factors, i.e anticolonial senitment against the British and anti-Muslim sentiment fueled by India’s national rivalry with Pakistan, Hinduism has somehow been coopted into the narrative of a jingoistic, monotheistic, mono-ethnic state which is  historical nonsense.

India has always been a pointedly pluralistic society, and in fact the geographical area now known as “India” does not even cover the geographical area of the India of antiquity. That India was a place of Hindus, Budhists, Muslims, Zoroastrians and everything in between. Hinduism never saw a problem with pluralism because Hinduism itself is a very plural religion – it has at least 13 major deities. The conversion of the Hindu identity into a political identity movement is a recent and contrived phenomenon first exploited by Gandhi as a means of opposing British colonialism, and now by Modi to oppose the Pakistanis/Muslims – it is a historical falsity.

The creation of Hindu fundamentalist movements like the RSS (which PM Modi belongs to) is something done in response to environmental factors. Spectacles like the RSS march below are evidence of yet another religion undergoing constant and ongoing evolution into whatever suits its purposes.

Something similar happened when medieval Europe turned into colonial Europe and European Christianity transitioned into a peaceful and pacifist ideology after centuries of being a bloodthirsty doctrine. The environmental factors that created the Crusades, the Spanish Inquisition, book burnings and witch hunts went away with the introduction of an industrial society, and thus the religion too transitioned.

In plain English, what all this means is that nobody actually practises a religion in the pure sense they imagine they do. Everyone who subscribes to a religion merely practises a version of it that is subject to the culture and circumstances of their environment and era. This is directly connected to the next major insight raised by these events.

Geopolitics is all About Self-Interest…Everyone Gets it Except Africa

While anti-Muslim violence has continued apace for years in China, Mynammar and India, the question has often been asked: “Why are the wealthy Arab nations not saying anything?” There is a perception that since the Arabian peninsula is the birthplace of Islam and Arabs – particularly Saudis – are viewed as the global gatekeepers of the faith, they must be at the forefront of promoting the interests of Muslims worldwide.

To many, the fabulous wealth and international influence that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE enjoy, in addition to the presence of two of Islam’s holiest cities – Mecca and Meddinah – in Saudi Arabia, means that they have a responsibility to speak for the global Muslim Ummah and stand up for them when they are unfairly targeted and mistreated. Unfortunately for such people, the wealthy nations of the Arab Gulf region tend to respond to such questions with little more than an irritated silence – and with good reason.

To begin with, these countries are not democracies led by the wishes of their almost uniformly Muslim populations. They are autocracies led by royal families who came to power in the colonially-influenced 20th century scramble for power and influence. Saudi Arabia, which houses Islam’s holiest sites, is named after the House of Saud, its royal family which came into power in its current form at the turn of the 19th century. The priority of the regimes in these countries first and foremost is self-preservation.

Self-preservation means that before throwing their significant diplomatic and economic weight behind any attempt to help out fellow Muslims, the first consideration is how doing so will benefit them. India for example, is a country that has close diplomatic ties with the UAE, and supplies most of their cheap labour for construction and low-skilled functions. India has even coordinated with UAE special forces to repatriate the dissident Princess Latika when she made an audacious escape attempt in 2018.

What does the UAE stand to gain if it napalms its diplomatic relationship with India by criticising Modi’s blatantly anti-Muslim policy direction? It might win a few brownie points with Islamic hardliners and possibly buy some goodwill among poor Muslims in South Asia, but how much is that worth? The regime and nation’s self-interest is best served by looking the other way, so that is exactly what they will do.

The Saudis make a similar calculation. At a time when they are investing heavily in military hardware to keep up with their eternal rivals Turkey and Iran, and simultaneously preparing for the end of oil by liberalising their society and economy, does it pay them to jump into an issue in India that does not particularly affect them? As the status of their diplomatic relationship with the U.S. remains unclear following the Jamal Khasshoggi incident, are they going to risk pissing off the Chinese because of Uighur Muslims?

In fact self-interest like that mentioned here is the basis of the considerations that underpin all international relations. Well I say “all,” but what I really meant to say was “all except African countries.” It is only African countries that take diplomatic decisions based on little more than flimsy emotions and feelings of religious affinity. Gambia for example, has dragged Myanmar before the UN and filed a genocide case against it on behalf of the Rohingya Muslims.

This would be commendable and great were it not that Gambia itself is hardly a human rights luminary, and generally has little business fighting an Asian battle when its own worse African battles lie unfought. The only thing Gambia stands to gain from fighting a diplomatic war that the rest of the world seems unwilling to touch is the temporary goodwill of a few Muslims in Asia and around the world – goodwill that cannot translate into something tangible for it.

To coin an aphorism from social media lingo, you could call it ”diplomatic clout chasing.’

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BUK Emerges Top in Global Digital Challenge, Gets Facebook Honorable Mention – PRNigeria News

BUK Emerges Top in Global Digital Challenge, Gets Facebook Honorable Mention

Bayero University Kano (BUK) has emerged top four among world Universities in the just concluded Fall 2019 Peer-to-Peer: Facebook Global Digital Challenge.

The University emerged runner up after Masaryk University — (Czech Republic) – FakeScape, Middle East Technical University — (Turkey) – Kiz Basina, Xavier University – Ateneo de Cagayan (Philippines) – I AM MINDANAO, thereby defeating Haigazian University Lebenon, Lithuania Christian College International University, ABTI American University of Nigeria (AUN) and Lagos State University Nigeria, most of whom were defending champions.

This season, the top three teams will be presenting their campaigns at the end of March 2020 in Brussels, Belgium to a panel of senior leaders, policymakers and guests.

In an email to participating teams, the Programs Project Manager, Paige M. Blair stated that, “The variety, insight, and creativity of the campaigns this term were beyond impressive and made judging quite difficult. All schools are commended for the innovative ways they positively impacted their local communities.”

BUK’s campaign was themed “HeartUmight,” and it focused on ethnic based hate speeches as a bane on our collective unity and source of other divisive tendencies with a view to inspiring at risk youths and the silent majority into countering such narratives online.

As runner up to the finalists, BUK’s HeartUmight got a honorable mention from Facebook and a $500 Facebook Ad Credit to continue scaling their work online.

Speaking, the Faculty Coordinator of the program, Dr. Nura Ibrahim, who is also the Head of the Department of Information and Media Studies said, “We are glad we made impact and got recognized for the impact we made. Our long term aims were clearly mapped out from the outset and our vision is to create an online inclusive society where culture and diversity is unified.”

Also speaking, Dr. Muhammad Danja the Staff Adviser for the campaign and also a lecturer with the Department expressed enthusiasm about future of the campaign. “As a build up on our previous effort, we were able to look inwards and design ba campaign that will make impact, stand firm and scale up in line with the overall goal of the challenge, that was why we were able to defeat Haigazian and ABTI American University who were actually defending champions this term so I am optimistic we shall emerge finalist in our next outing.”

On his part, the team lead, Muhammad Dahiru Lawal a 300Level Student of the Department of Information and Media Studies explains that, “In planning our strategy for the Campaign, we discovered that apart from religious based hate speeches, ethnic based hate speech are basically the most dominant in our online trails as indicated by our research, hence we decided to design a campaign that is unifying.”

He further said that, “we had hoped to make the finalist but at least we made a difference by winning in our own way. This is not the end of the road.”
Facebook Global Digital Challenge, is geared towards making a social impact on internet behaviour especially as it involves posts and comments considered violent, debasing and inflammatory by the receiving party.

The P2P Challenge is sponsored by Facebook and managed by EdVenture Partners (EVP).

As at the end of the Fall 2018 term, the P2P Challenge has been implemented over 695 times at over 400 universities in 75 countries and 40 U.S. states. P2P has generated over 200 million combined online and offline impressions since its inception in spring 2015.

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Saudi Court Sentences Five To Death For Murder Of Jamal Khashoggi

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A court in Saudi Arabia on Monday sentenced five people to death over the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi last year.

Khashoggi, a prominent critic of the Saudi Palace, was killed inside the kingdom’s consulate in the Turkish city of Istanbul by a team of Saudi agents.

The Saudi authorities said it was the result of a “rogue operation” and put 11 unnamed individuals on trial.

The Riyadh Criminal Court sentenced five individuals to death for “committing and directly participating in the murder of the victim”, according to the public prosecution’s statement.

Three others were handed prison sentences totalling 24 years for “covering up this crime and violating the law”, while the remaining three were found not guilty.

The 59-year-old journalist, a US-based columnist for the Washington Post, was last seen entering the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey, on October 2, 2018, to obtain papers he needed to marry his fiancée, Hatice Cengiz.

Khashoggi, however, never came out alive to meet Cengiz, and his body was mutilated and deposed off to a local Turkish collaborator, according to the Saudi account.

According to a statement by the Saudi public prosecutor, a total of 31 individuals were investigated over the killing and 21 of them were arrested. Eleven were eventually referred to trial at the Riyadh Criminal Court and the public prosecutor sought the death penalty for five of them.

Agnes Callamard, the United Nations Special Rapporteur, had in June claimed that the five people facing the death penalty were Fahad Shabib Albalawi; Turki Muserref Alshehri; Waleed Abdullah Alshehri; Maher Abdulaziz Mutreb, an intelligence officer; and Dr Salah Mohammed Tubaigy, a forensic doctor with the interior ministry.

However, Saud al-Qahtani, a senior aide to the Crown Prince, who was sacked and investigated over the killing, and Ahmad Asiri, a former Deputy Intelligence Chief, were not charged for the murder. they were both seen by the international community as the brains behind the killing of Khashoggi.

Also not convicted was the Crown Prince, who human right groups and advocates said “definitely” issued the instruction to his subordinates to kill the outspoken journalist.

The prince denied any involvement, but in October he said he took “full responsibility as a leader in Saudi Arabia, especially since it was committed by individuals working for the Saudi government”.

Shalaan Shalaan, Saudi Arabia’s deputy public prosecutor, at a press conference on Monday said the public prosecution’s investigations had shown that “there was no premeditation to kill at the beginning of the mission”.

“The investigation showed that the killing was not premeditated… The killing was in the spur of the moment, when the head of the negotiating team inspected the premises of the consulate and realised that it was impossible to move the victim to a safe place to resume negotiations.

“The head of the negotiating team and the perpetrators then discussed and agreed to kill the victim inside the consulate,” he said.

But Callamard, who authored a UN-backed report in June which stated that Saudi Arabia and the Crown Prince were responsible for the murder, said in a post on Twitter that the investigation and trial lacked credibility.

“Bottom line: the hit-men are guilty, sentenced to death. The masterminds not only walk free. They have barely been touched by the investigation and the trial,” her tweet read.

Cengiz, Khashoggi’s fiancee, described the Saudi verdict as  “not acceptable”.

Human Rights Watch said the trial, which took place behind closed doors, did not meet international standards and that the Saudi authorities had “obstructed meaningful accountability”.

The Turkish foreign ministry said the decision of the Saudi court was “far from meeting the expectations of both our country and the international community to shed light on the murder with all its dimensions and deliver justice”.

The public prosecution said it would decide whether to review the court’s rulings and decide whether to appeal. The death sentences must be upheld by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.

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Saudi sentences five to death, three to jail over Khashoggi killing

Saudi Arabia on Monday sentenced five people to death and three more to jail terms, totalling 24 years, over the killing of Saudi journalist, Jamal Khashoggi, in Istanbul in October last year.

Saudi Deputy Public Prosecutor and spokesman, Shalaan al-Shalaan, reading out the verdict in the trial, said the court dismissed charges against the remaining three of the 11 people that had been on trial, finding them not guilty.

Khashoggi was a U.S. resident and critic of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the kingdom’s de facto ruler.

He was last seen at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul on Oct. 2, 2018, where he had gone to receive papers ahead of his wedding.

His body was reportedly dismembered and removed from the building, and his remains have not been found.

The killing caused a global uproar, tarnishing the crown prince’s image.

The CIA and some Western governments have said they believe Prince Mohammed ordered the killing, but Saudi officials say he had no role.

Eleven Saudi suspects were put on trial over his death in secretive proceedings in Riyadh.

In the investigation into the murder, 21 were arrested and 10 were called in for questioning without arrest, Shalaan said.

Riyadh’s criminal court pronounced the death penalty on five individuals, whose names have not yet been released, “for committing and directly participating in the murder of the victim’’.

READ ALSO: Khashoggi memorial to be held outside Saudi consulate

The three sentenced to prison were given various sentences totalling 24 years “for their role in covering up this crime and violating the law’’.

Shalaan added that the investigations proved there was no “prior enmity” between those convicted and Khashoggi.

The verdicts can still be appealed.

Last November, the Saudi prosecutor said that Saud al-Qahtani, a former high-profile Saudi royal adviser, discussed Khashoggi’s activities before he entered the Saudi consulate with the team that went on to kill him.

The prosecutor said Qahtani acted in coordination with Deputy Intelligence Chief Ahmed al-Asiri, who he said, had ordered Khashoggi’s repatriation from Turkey and that the lead negotiator on the ground then decided to kill him.

Both men were dismissed from their positions but while Asiri went on trial, Qahtani did not.

On Monday Shalaan said Asiri has been released due to insufficient evidence and Qahtani had been investigated but was not charged and had been released.

Reuters/NAN)

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Trump leaving NATO: dangerous for U.S., nightmare for Israel – Haaretz.com

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This article was first published on January 17, 2019

When Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi, the new Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces, settled into his office at the Kirya after being sworn in Tuesday, he had a long list of military challenges to plan for: Rockets and tunnels by Hamas and Hezbollah, Iran’s persistent threatening stance against Israel in Syria, Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear programs.

One thing he probably never thought he would have to add to that list was planning for the possibility of a U.S. withdrawal from NATO. 

The day is almost over, and no one from the Administration has denied the NYT story about Trump wanting to pull out of NATO. Worse, no one from the Administration would dare say he would never do it. Because they know he might.

— Dan Shapiro (@DanielBShapiro)

But as he learned from the New York Times, the possibility is very much on President Donald Trump’s mind.

It is no small matter for Israel.

In the first instance, Israel benefits from NATO because of the way it broadens U.S. influence. NATO is an alliance, but it also entails its European members willingly accepting the United States’ leadership position on the continent.

U.S. allies outside the alliance benefit from the association. It has helped earn Israel a seat at the table as a NATO partner, has opened doors to cooperation with non-U.S. militaries, and helps prevent escalatory scenarios in moments of tension between Israel and NATO members, notably Turkey. In a post-NATO world, Israel’s alignment would be with an isolated United States that lacks the multiplying effect of broader Western support.

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But the operational effects could be far more challenging. Israel maintains impressive self-defense capabilities, which will be sustained in any scenario, but its security partnership with the United States, another critical pillar of its defense policy, will be forced to adapt in complicated ways.

The day-to-day relationships between the IDF and the U.S. military are conducted via U.S. European Command. U.S. forces based in Germany are the ones who travel to Israel by the thousands to conduct joint exercises, including those that drill bringing Patriot missile batteries to augment Israel’s domestic capabilities and help defend Israel in the case of a major conflict.  

U.S. Navy destroyers, home-ported in Spain and equipped with Aegis missile defense capabilities, are among the Sixth Fleet’s ships that sail regularly in the Eastern Mediterranean (and make port calls in Haifa) to ensure adequate support for Israel’s defense. U.S. Air Force squadrons based in Italy come to Israel to conduct joint air exercises with the Israeli Air Force. Other U.S. troops sit even closer, at Incirlik Air Force Base in Eastern Turkey.

Remove the United States from NATO – and forward-deployed U.S. forces from Europe, which would certainly follow – and the United States’ ability to respond to a Middle East crisis would be diminished.

Could U.S. support for Israel be shifted and coordinated instead through U.S. Central Command, based in the Persian Gulf? It has been proposed before as an efficiency measure. But Israeli generals have always resisted the proposal. Their worry is that they would find it challenging to enjoy the same level of intimacy they currently have with Europe-based U.S. commanders, with commanders who maintain a similar closeness with Arab militaries. 

True, Israel is closer strategically today with the Arab Gulf states than at any time in its history, because of a focus on the common threat of Iran and the lower priority of the Palestinian issue. But those relationships are a long way from being normalized – and could still backslide.

Israeli security planners are, therefore, still most likely to want to maintain separation between their relationships with the U.S. military and with their Arab neighbors. Having observed the intense friendships formed between Israeli military commanders and their U.S. counterparts based in Europe, I can say that these ties will not be easily replaced.

The broader Middle East would also experience the effects of NATO’s demise in the form of further empowerment of Russia. That is happening already, but losing NATO would turbocharge those trends.

Already, Russia’s brutally decisive intervention in Syria, combined with successive U.S. administrations’ preference to reduce active U.S. military engagements in the region, have led many regional states to explore expanded security ties with Russia.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu meets more frequently with Putin than he does with Trump, and the IDF and Russian Air Force deconflict their operations in Syria. The leaders of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, all close partners of the United States, have visited Moscow and explored acquiring advanced Russian weapons systems in addition to their American-supplied arsenals.

Should Russia decide to exert leverage, such as by constraining Israeli freedom of action against Iranian military targets in Syria, the United States would be ill-equipped to push back.

A U.S. withdrawal from NATO would unmistakably be understood as a major pullback from the United States’s leadership in global affairs. The effect of expanding Russian influence would be felt far beyond Europe and the Middle East.

Military planners are renowned for imagining, and developing options for, every possible scenario. So General Kochavi and his colleagues will find a way to prepare, and put themselves in a position to adapt. But there are certain anchors that any country hopes to maintain, particularly one facing as many threats, and so tied to its American ally, as Israel.

To avoid having to grapple with the nightmarish set of problems that would result from the U.S. leaving NATO, General Kochavi might consider recommending to his Prime Minister and Defense Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, that he use his influence with President Trump to dissuade him from such a dangerous course.

Daniel B. Shapiro is Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv. He served as U.S. Ambassador to Israel, and Senior Director for the Middle East and North Africa in the Obama Administration. Twitter: @DanielBShapiro

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Turkey Converts Historic Church Building into Mosque

The Turkish Council of State has approved the conversion of a historic Greek Orthodox Church into a place of Islamic worship.

The Byzantine-era “Chora” Church was originally built in the early 4th century as a monastery complex outside the walls of Constantinople. It was later converted to a mosque after the Ottoman invasion of Istanbul.

In 1945, the church was restored and preserved as the “Kariye Museum.” Despite its conversion back to a symbol of Christianity, a lawsuit was later filed by the Association of Permanent Foundations and Service to Historical Artifacts and Environment claiming that the building was a mosque and thus belonged to the Fatih Sultan Mehmet Foundation.

The recent decision by the Council of State backs this belief and clears the way for the building to be converted into a functioning mosque, according to International Christian Concern.

“The Kariye mosque… is one of the public immovables belonging to the Fatih Sultan Mehmet Foundation,” the council said in a statement, reports the Greek City Times.

Belief

Princeton University describes more about the church’s storied history and religious significance:

Great Revival Sweeping Through Iran As Hundreds Of Thousands Come To Jesus Christ

“Described by Osterhaut as ‘second in renown only to Hagia Sophia among the Byzantine churches of Istanbul’, Kariye Camii [Mosque] attracts much attention because of its rich mosaics and frescoes. The original structure was built by the Holy Theodus in 534 in the reign of Justinian. In the 11th and 12th centuries, it was rebuilt by the Comnenus family and dedicated to Christ (thus the name, Christ in Chora). The structure suffered the great earthquake of 1296 and was later converted into a mosque in 1511 after the Turks conquered Istanbul. Since 1948, the building has been the Kariye Museum, a popular tourist attraction.”

In March of this year, Turkish President Recep Erdogan declared that the iconic Hagia Sophia cathedral, which is also being preserved as a museum transformed into a place of Islamic worship.

“As you know, the mosque was converted to a museum in 1935, as a reflection of the (Republican People’s Party) CHP mentality. We may as well take a step and change that,” Erdogan was quoted as saying, according to the Greek Reporter, prompting outrage from the Christian community.

Many believe that this latest announcement will speed up the process of converting the Hagia Sophia to a full-fledged mosque.

CBN

Historian Dr. Vassilios Meichanetsidis told the Greek Times that the mosque conversions are “a sign of Islamic conquest and supremacy” that have their roots in the Ottoman period and the brutal islamization of the region.

“It was widely practised in the times of conquest and throughout the Ottoman period and thus most of the truly superb Byzantine churches were converted into mosques and suffered serious damages,” assilios added.

“In many ways, the conversions of churches into mosques or museums area part of a genocidal process in which a physical genocide of human beings (Greeks, Armenians and Assyrians/Arameans) has turned into a cultural genocide.”

Offering her analysis of the situation to Faithwire, International Christian Concern’s Regional Manager for the Middle East, Claire Evans said:

“When reading the New Testament, it is apparent that the history of the Church is built upon the soil of Turkey. The country was first Christian, but the invasion of the Ottomans was followed by the steady erasure of this land’s Christian history. Although modern-day Turkey is constitutionally secular, the current political environment is increasingly Islamic.

The environment reinforces the belief that Christianity is a foreign religion to Turkey, and thus a threat to the nation. Indeed, President Erdogan has built his base around concepts that polarize and deepens an “us versus them” mentality. Historic churches prove a difficult concept for Turkey; many do not realize that their country was first Christian, and that Islam is actually the foreign religion. Turning historic churches, now functioning as museums, into mosques scores political points for a government that finds its identity in the country’s Ottoman history.

CBN

The post Turkey Converts Historic Church Building into Mosque appeared first on Believers Portal.

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A year later, what Khashoggi’s murder says about Trump’s close ally

(CNN)A year ago, Jamal Khashoggi, a prominent Saudi writer, entered the Saudi consulate in Istanbul to obtain paperwork so he could marry his Turkish fiance, who was waiting for him outside the building. He was never seen again.

A contributor to the Washington Post, Khashoggi, aged 59, was a critic of the Saudi regime and was living in self-imposed exile in the United States. He was murdered inside the Istanbul consulate on October 2, 2018, by a team that was dispatched from Saudi Arabia, among them associates of the Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman — known as MBS — the then-32-year-old de facto ruler of the country.
The Saudis (and MBS himself) have consistently denied that bin Salman had any direct role in Khashoggi’s murder and instead have ascribed it to a rogue operation by overzealous subordinates. They charged 11 of them, five of whom face a possible death penalty, although given the opaque nature of the Saudi legal system little is clear about the yet unresolved case.
    In November 2018, the CIA concluded — with “high confidence” according to the Washington Post — that bin Salman had ordered the murder of Khashoggi.
    Khashoggi’s murder brought into sharp focus concerns about the judgment of the young prince that had percolated for years. MBS had variously entered an ongoing war in Yemen that, according to the UN, had precipitated the worst humanitarian crisis on the planet; he had blockaded the gas-rich state of Qatar, a close American ally and the site of the most important US military base in the Middle East. Domestically, MBS had also imprisoned a host of clerics, dissidents and businessmen.

      Trump: ‘I’m extremely angry’ about Khashoggi killing

    At first it looked like Trump might distance himself from MBS. Less than two weeks after Khashoggi’s murder on CBS’s “60 Minutes,” President Donald Trump promised “severe punishment” for the Saudis if it was proven that they had murdered Khashoggi. Khashoggi, after all, was both a legal resident of the United States and a journalist who was contributing regularly to a major American media institution.
    A month later, Trump backpedaled, citing putative massive American arms sales to the Saudis. Trump told reporters, “…it’s ‘America First’ for me. It’s all about ‘America First.’ We’re not going to give up hundreds of billions of dollars in orders, and let Russia, China, and everybody else have them … military equipment and other things from Russia and China. … I’m not going to destroy the economy for our country by being foolish with Saudi Arabia.”
    Until Khashoggi’s murder, it was possible to emphasize the positive case for bin Salman, to argue that he was genuinely reforming Saudi Arabia’s society and economy. He had clipped the wings of the feared religious police in the kingdom and had given women greater freedoms, such as the right to drive and a larger role in the workplace.
    Bin Salman encouraged concerts and movie theaters in a society that had long banned both and he also started to end the rigid gender separation in the kingdom by, for instance, allowing women to attend sports events.
    He also promised a magical moment in the Middle East when the Arab states could deliver a peace deal with the Palestinians, while he was liberating his people from the stultifying yoke of Sunni Wahhabism that had nurtured so many of the 9/11 plotters. For many years, Washington had puzzled over whether Saudi Arabia was more of an arsonist or a firefighter when it came to the propagation of militant Islam. Bin Salman appeared to be a firefighter.

      Wolf Blitzer presses senator over meeting with world leader

    MBS also has a somewhat plausible plan for diversifying the heavily oil-dependent Saudi economy known as Vision 2030, to be financed in part by the sale of parts of the oil giant Aramco, which may be the world’s most valuable corporation with a market value that the Saudis hope is two trillion dollars.
    In March 2018, MBS even visited Hollywood and Silicon Valley, where he ditched his Arab robes in favor of a suit and where he was feted as a reformer by film stars and tech industry heavyweights.
    But after Khashoggi’s murder, the positive case for Mohammed bin Salman was largely submerged in the West, where he was increasingly viewed as an impetuous autocrat. In 2015, he had authorized the disastrous and ongoing war in neighboring Yemen, in which tens of thousands of civilians have been killed. He had also effectively kidnapped the Lebanese Prime Minister, a dual Lebanese-Saudi citizen, when he was on a trip to Saudi Arabia. And MBS led the blockade of his country’s neighbor, gas-rich Qatar, which continues to this day.
    In addition to his arrests of prominent clerics and dissidents, Bin Salman, in a palace coup, supplanted his cousin Mohamed bin Nayef as crown prince in 2017. Famously, MBS also imprisoned 200 rich Saudis at the Ritz Carlton in Riyadh and had relieved them of more than $100 billion because of their purported corruption.
    Now Bin Salman faces what may be his most difficult foreign policy challenge yet: What to do about the drone and missile attacks earlier this month against the crown jewel of Saudi Arabia’s economy, the Aramco Abqaiq oil facility, an attack the crown prince and the Trump administration have plausibly blamed Iran for. The Iranians have denied involvement in the attacks
    This attack is particularly problematic for MBS, as he is also Saudi minister of defense and he has presided over a massive arms buildup, yet was not able to defend the kingdom against the missile and drone barrage that took down half of Saudi’s oil capacity, at least temporarily.

      Post-Khashoggi murder, why should U.S. believe anything Saudi Arabia has to say?

    The Iranian attack also poses a quandary for President Trump, who doesn’t want the United States to get embroiled in another war in the Middle East, even though he has embraced MBS as a close ally.
    On Sunday, CBS’s “60 Minutes” aired an interview with bin Salman in which he said that he hoped that Saudi Arabia could reach a “political and peaceful solution” with Iran.
      One can only hope that MBS and Trump don’t launch a war against Iran, which has a large army, significant proxy forces around the Middle East and sophisticated ballistic missile systems. However, it’s hard to imagine them not responding at all since the Iranians have shown they can now attack with impunity a key node of the world’s energy markets.
      Mohammed bin Salman may be able to preside over the murder of a dissident journalist in Turkey with relative ease, but there is little in his conduct of foreign policy hitherto to suggest that he will skillfully deal with the Iranians.

      Read more: http://edition.cnn.com/

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